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Abstract
Only a libertarian would think to base an analysis of the 
abortion controversy on private property rights. The 
present paper does just that.  On that basis, it concludes 
that evictionism is the only policy compatible with lib-
ertarianism. This essay then uses this analysis to criticize 
the views on this subject of five scholars associated with 
this political philosophy: Feser, Goodwin, Mosquito, Sad-
owsky, Vance and Watkins.
Keywords: pro-life; pro-choice; evictionism; libertarian-
ism; abortion.
Resumo
Apenas um libertário pensaria em basear uma análise so-
bre a controvérsia do aborto em direitos de propriedade. O 
presente artigo faz justamente isso. Seguindo essa linha, 
conclui-se que o eviccionismo é a única política compatível 
com o libertarianismo. Esse trabalho, pois, utiliza essa ferra-
menta de análise para criticar as opiniões sobre aborto de 
cinco professores alinhados a essa corrente filosófica: Feser, 
Goodwin, Mosquito, Sadowsky, Vance e Watkins.
Palavras-chave: pró-vida; pró-escolha; eviccionismo; 
libertarianismo; aborto.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Libertarianism is predicated upon the sanctity of private property rights and the 
non-aggression principle (NAP).
There has been an exhaustive and fierce debate amongst non-libertarians re-
garding the pro-choice versus pro-life philosophies. However, since none of them start 
off with libertarian principles, let alone adhere, rigidly, to them throughout, the con-
clusions they reach are almost necessarily guaranteed to diverge, widely, from those 
reached by members of the libertarian school of thought. The present paper considers 
several contributions to this debate authored by libertarians. If no one else can be ex-
pected to observe the NAP based on private property rights, then, at least, they can be 
expected to do so. Hence, we suspect, there might be a consensus, at least in this small 
arena of scholarship, on this issue. If so, we will be sadly disappointed. It would appear 
that this issue is fraught with so many complexities, and subtleties that even those who, 
presumably, start out on the basis of shared principles, all too often diverge from one 
another.
In the following sections of this paper we criticize the views on abortion on the 
part of several scholars associated with the libertarian political philosophy. They are in 
section II, Feser; III, Goodwin; IV, Mosquito; V, Sadowsky; V, Vance; VI, Watkins. Section 
VII is our conclusion. I have chosen these authors and their views on abortion because, 
while all are associated with libertarianism, none have supported the evictionist view I 
maintain is a direct deduction from libertarian principles, non-aggression, and private 
property rights based upon homesteading virgin territory. That is to say, it is my conten-
tion that libertarians who do not embrace evictionism fail to carry out, fully, the logic of 
their own basic premises.  If I cannot even convince libertarians that evictionism is the 
only just answer to the pro-life, pro-choice controversy, then I have little hope to do so 
with the population at large. The present paper, then, is dedicated to trying to grab up 
low hanging intellectual fruit who do not accept evictionism as the only valid answer 
to the abortion debate.
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2. FESER 
Feser’s connection with libertarianism is tenuous at best.1 For one thing, he is 
concerned with “moral” issues, in contrast to libertarians who focus on a narrow subset 
of ethics, namely, what comprises just law.2 For another, he embraces positive obliga-
tions, anathema for the libertarian.3 He posits that “Adam” is the legitimate owner of an 
entire small island, and, yet, is obligated to stand by and allow “Zelda” to trespass on his 
property, given that she needs to do so in order to remain alive. On this ground, whene-
ver anyone is starving anywhere on the planet, Feser’s analysis would imply that other 
people are obligated to come to their rescue. Whatever else it may be, this doctrine is 
hardly a libertarian one.4
However, Feser5 quite properly takes Thomson6 to task as favoring the pro-abor-
tion side of the debate, and, also, convincingly undermines her position.  The latter au-
thor, it will be remembered, analogizes pregnancy along the lines of a famous violinist 
being hooked up to your kidney, without your permission. States Feser of Thomson’s 
position: “…it isn’t clear how it would justify any abortion other than in the case of 
pregnancy resulting from rape, with which the kidnapping by the violinist’s admirers 
is analogous. Surely a pregnancy resulting from consensual intercourse — which, as 
everyone knows, has a chance of resulting in pregnancy even when contraception is 
used — is not analogous to Thomson’s example.” This is a telling point of Feser’s, in that 
both the target of the violinist, and the woman who is pregnant as the result of rape, 
are placed in the position of host against their will. They are victims according to liber-
tarian law, and the remedy, at the very least, ought to include saving them from their 
1  FESER, Edward. Self-ownership, abortion, and the rights of children: toward a more conservative libertaria-
nism. . Journal of Libertarian Studies, Auburn, vol. 18, n. 3, p. 91-114, june/sept. 2004.
2  For example, Feser focuses on “a moral difference with regard to the rape victim’s obligations;” discusses how 
a woman “may morally extricate herself” from a predicament; and asks “Would it be morally permissible to 
destroy the protoplasm…”
3  The main connection between him and this essay of his on the one hand and libertarianism on the other is 
that it appeared in the Journal of Libertarian Studies, the flagship of this philosophy. Another linkage is that this 
author once considered himself a libertarian, but no longer does. See on that Feser (FESER, Edward. Self-owner-
ship, abortion, and the rights of children: toward a more conservative libertarianism. . Journal of Libertarian 
Studies, Auburn, vol. 18, n. 3, p. 91-114, june/sept. 2004); also BLOCK, Walter E. Response to Feser on libertaria-
nism. Journal Etica e Politica/Ethics & Politics, Trieste. Forthcoming.
4  This author also indicates his support for positive obligations when he asserts: “Children, unlike the progeny 
of non-human animals, are entirely helpless at birth. It follows that, on libertarian principles, anyone who brin-
gs a child into the world has a duty to do what is necessary to provide for that child, since not to do so would 
be a clear violation of that child’s self-ownership — a putting of that child in a position in which its capacities 
are completely nullified. Child neglect and endangerment, even when it is non-invasive, is an obvious violation 
of the SOP.” (Self-Ownership Proviso.)
5  FESER, Edward.Self-ownership, abortion, and the rights of children: toward a more conservative libertaria-
nism. . Journal of Libertarian Studies, Auburn, vol. 18, n. 3, p. 91-114, june/sept. 2004.
6  THOMSON, Judith Jarvis. A Defense of Abortion. Philosophy & Public Affairs, New Jersey, vol. 1, n. 1, p. 69-
80, sept./dec. 1971.
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present plight. This means that the host of the violinist may cut him loose, and that the 
pregnant woman ought to be allowed to evict her unwanted fetus.7
But this analysis is marred by Feser’s insistence that even in the case of rape the 
victim is precluded from separating herself from the fetus. He states:
If one accepts the SOP,8 then it is difficult to see how one can fail to condemn abortion, 
even in the case of rape, and certainly in the case of pregnancy resulting from consensual 
intercourse. A woman  — and the man she sleeps with — are in the latter case like Adam, 
should he decide to fire cannonballs at passing ships and then complain that people 
keep washing up on his island whom he now has to allow ashore.9
The obvious reductio ad absurdum to this position, vis a vis Thomson, is that the 
violinist would then have a right to the use of your kidney for however long he needs it 
to maintain himself. For any lesser scholar than Feser, this would be enough to blow his 
theory out of the water. But this writer does not run away from this untenable implica-
tion of this theory. Rather, brazenly, he embraces it: “Accordingly, it would seem also to 
follow that you must remain attached to the violinist in Thomson’s example….” It is dif-
ficult to deal with a philosopher who claims that the innocent person beset upon by the 
violinist must not cast him off. Is there such a thing as a super reductio ad absurdum, 
or, perhaps, the reductio ad absurdum squared, or, maybe, even, cubed? If followed 
to its logical conclusion, any criminal may do anything he wishes to any victim – up to 
and including rape, murder, enslavement – provided only that the perpetrator requires 
this action in order to maintain his well-being. Here we have a veritable clash of rights, 
something else that is anathema to the libertarian philosophy. For one person’s well-
-being is set against that of another, and we are as at sea without a compass; we have 
no way of determining just who is in the right. It will not suffice, against Feser, to claim 
that the mother owns her womb, and that therefore the baby, no matter how innocent, 
is a trespasser, and that she is entitled to remove him from her premises. For if even the 
person victimized by the violinist may not separate from him, then no victim, no slave, 
no target of rape, may resist her attacker, so long as the latter is in great need of the 
physical body of the victim.
Feser also misconstrues Thomson’s example of the “people seeds.” She very pro-
perly uses this a defense against the charge that if a woman agrees to have intercourse, 
7  We go along with both Feser and Thomson in positing, arguendo, that the fetus, at any stage of its develop-
ment, is a rights-bearing human being.
8  Feser borrows this SOP from Mack (MACK, Eric. The Self-Ownership Proviso: A New and Improved Lockean 
Proviso. Social Philosophy and Policy, Cambridge, vol. 12, n. 1, jan./mar. 1995.). It is equivalent the common 
libertarian claim that we are all self-owners, and that therefore the initiation of violence against us would be 
illicit.
9  FESER, Edward. 2004. Self-ownership, abortion, and the rights of children: toward a more conservative liber-
tarianism. . Journal of Libertarian Studies, Auburn, vol. 18, n. 3, p. 91-114, june/sept. 2004. p. 104.
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knowing that a possible result would be pregnancy, she still has not agreed, explicitly 
through contract, nor, even, implicitly, to house the baby for nine months. Her point 
was that if there were “people seeds” that could enter a home and create adult persons, 
and, if a woman opened her door or window and they got in and grew, she still would 
not be responsible to maintain them. Feser attempts to undermine this brilliant point 
of hers as follows: “Surely, though, the disanalogy here is obvious: sperm is hardly as 
difficult to avoid as Thomson’s people seeds are, and unlike the latter, one has positively 
to do something to get it, something one is fully capable of refraining from. It is not as 
if we are, as with the people seeds, constantly bombarded with it.” But this will not do. 
First of all, the different likelihoods of creating a baby in the ordinary way, or an adult in 
this science fiction-ish manner, should be irrelevant. We are talking principles here, not 
probabilities. Secondly, in both cases is it true that the woman must “do something to 
get it”: agree to sexual relations, or, open a door or window.
What of evictionism? That entire idea nowhere enters into Feser’s ken.  And with 
“good” reason: if even the victim of rape must be compelled by law to keep her baby full 
term, then, for this author, no woman, for any reason, can be allowed to escape this fate. 
All that can be said about this analysis of Feser’s is that it is difficult to reconcile with 
libertarianism. Does not the woman own her own womb? Not at all, for Feser.
3.  GOODWIN
This author offers no fewer than thirteen arguments against evictionism. I in-
tend to refute each and every one of them, despite the fact that this will call for some 
repetitiveness.10 Why? His libertarian credentials are impeccable.11 If even staunch 
libertarians such as this scholar cannot see their way clear to an understanding that 
evictionism is the only correct libertarian solution to the abortion debate, there is little 
hope than advocates of other philosophies will come to see it either. Therefore, it is 
imperative to pulverize his perspective.
3.1.  Abortion is killing, but is it murder?
Well, I lied. In this section Goodwin merely summarizes Block and Whitehe-
ad12 and Rothbard13; he does not yet launch into his critique. However, even in this 
10  Several of his objections overlap one another.
11  Ordinarily, an author who writes a sentence of this sort would be expected to document it. I cannot do so, 
since “Goodwin” is a nom de plume. However, I am personally acquainted with this philosopher, and can vouch 
for his libertarian credentials.
12  BLOCK, Walter E.; WHITEHEAD, Roy. Compromising the Uncompromisable: A Private Property Rights Approa-
ch to Resolving the Abortion Controversy. Appalachian Journal of Law, Grundy, vol. 4, n. 1,  2005.
13  ROTHBARD, Murray N. The Ethics of Liberty. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 199/8.
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introduction of his, he writes: “Both have written in favor of abortion (Block via his con-
cept of ‘evictionism’)…” The problem here is that this conflates eviction and abortion, 
two very, very different concepts. The first means, merely, that the woman can expel, 
detached from, separate herself from, the fetus, and leaves it as an entirely open ques-
tion as to what will happen to her baby afterward. At present technology, the baby14 
first becomes viable when treated in this manner in the third trimester. Abortion, in 
very sharp distinction, is entirely a separate matter. It combines two different acts: the 
first, eviction, and the second, outright murder. When a landlord evicts a tenant from 
his rental unit for non-payment, he does not execute him. If he does, this becomes an 
entirely different matter. Think of partial birth abortion in the last trimester as one of 
the most heinous activities humans have ever perpetrated on members of their own 
species.15 The baby is perfectly capable of living outside of the womb. Yet, its brains are 
sucked out of it, and it is launched, dead, out into the open air. If that is not outright 
despicable murder, murder most foul, then nothing is.16
3.2.  When does life begin?
Behold, another lie on my part. Goodwin and I are entirely in accord on this 
matter; we both maintain that human life begins with the fertilized egg, he on the basis 
of a mere assumption,17 me out of strong belief.18 No one doubts the baby is a human 
at birth. But, a few moments before, while still in the womb? There does not seem to be 
too much of a difference between the two. And, if not, the step back toward the ferti-
lized egg state is but a gradual one, with no obvious demarcation between human life 
and its absence. Of course, something similar may be said for the colors of the rainbow, 
ROYGBIV. They, too, shade into one another, and, yet, surely, we can demarcate, separa-
tely, each of these seven colors. I contend there is a disanalogy here. None of the colors 
“grow” into one another. They are separate entities. Not so for human development.
14  In an attempt not to set up a straw man argument, and, also, because this happens to be my view, I posit 
that human life begins with the fertilized egg. Neither the sperm alone, nor the egg alone, will in the ordinary 
course of things become a rights bearing human being; but, together, they will.
15  I abstract from cases where this procedure, and only this procedure, not eviction, is necessary to save the 
woman’s life or for her health.
16  In saying this, I reveal where my own heart is at: strongly with the pro-life side of this debate. However, this 
perspective is incorrect, since it would not allow eviction in the first two semesters, when the fetus cannot live 
outside of the womb, and this is justified under evictionism.
17  He states: “… my examination proceeds assuming that human life begins at conception.”
18  In the Jewish tradition, life begins when the fetus graduates from medical school. Well, when it has a hear-
t-beat. But this seems arbitrary. Why not when it attains brain waves?  Or a (semi) human shape? Or toes for 
that matter.
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3.3.  Abortion and failure to come to the aid
Goodwin quotes me19 accurately, as follows: “The woman who refuses to carry 
her fetus to term is in exactly the same position as a person who refuses to rescue a 
drowning swimmer.  Abortion is not, in and of itself, an act invasive of other people or 
their property rights, even when fetuses are considered persons.” However, I20 miss-
poke. I should not have use the word “abortion” there. Rather, the word I should have 
used, and now do, is “eviction.” So the sentences should read in this way: The woman 
who refuses to carry her fetus to term is in exactly the same position as a person who 
refuses to rescue a drowning swimmer.  Eviction Abortion is not, in and of itself, an 
act invasive of other people or their property rights, even when fetuses are considered 
persons.”
Goodwin claims a disanalogy here: “In the case of the drowning swimmer, the 
potential rescuer (presumably) did nothing to cause the swimmer to drown – the per-
son did not throw someone unable to swim into the middle of the ocean after inviting 
the novice to go for a boat ride.  However, the woman did take an action in the situation 
the act of becoming pregnant.  Aborting the unborn child is like deliberately throwing 
a non-swimmer into the middle of the Pacific Ocean after providing a formal invitation 
to a nine-month cruise – a cruise with no scheduled stops.  The invitation conveys an 
obligation; the act of throwing the person overboard is an aggressive act, in violation of 
the non-aggression principle.”
I must of course agree with this gifted libertarian theorist when he points to the 
NAP as crucial to the analysis. However, I fear he errs in several places. First, he focu-
ses on the fact that the woman “did take an action” to involve herself in this situation, 
while the boat owner was in no manner, way or shape responsible for the plight of the 
swimmer. Fair enough. However, merely “taking an action” does not logically imply res-
ponsibility for the results of that action. If a woman wears a mini skirt in some locales in 
Egypt, and more recently Cologne, Germany, she is likely to be molested, even raped. 
Is she responsible for that attack? Of course not. This would be entirely the fault of the 
person(s) committing the assault, not her. Just because the woman became pregnant 
obligates her to nothing whatsoever.  Thomson furnishes us with yet another exam-
ple.21 A woman opens her window. This makes it easier for a marauder to enter her pro-
perty. Is she legally, ethically, responsible for the evil that ensues? Again, of course not, 
Goodwin to the contrary notwithstanding.  Second what about rape? Here, the woman 
19  BLOCK, Walter E.; WHITEHEAD, Roy. Compromising the Uncompromisable: A Private Property Rights Approa-
ch to Resolving the Abortion Controversy. Appalachian Journal of Law, Grundy, vol. 4, n. 1, 2005.
20  This sentence came from the section of that paper to which I contributed. Therefore the fault, the error, is 
mine.
21  THOMSON, Judith Jarvis. A Defense of Abortion. Philosophy & Public Affairs, New Jersey, vol. 1, n. 1, p. 
69-80, sept./dec. 1971.
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also “takes an action.” She does not hire a bodyguard, and goes out for a walk, perhaps 
in a dangerous neighborhood. Is she therefore “responsible” for this crime? To ask this is 
to answer it. But I will answer it anyway: of course not.
3.4.  The unborn child is trespassing
In this section our author objects to the by now famous Thomson violinist sce-
nario as an analogy to pregnancy. He does so on the ground that the “mother took 
an action that could result (no matter the precaution taken) in pregnancy.” Therefore, 
she is responsible to keep the baby with her for nine months. One problem is with the 
case of rape. The baby who results from that heinous act is as innocent as any other. 
Yet, it would appear that all babies have equal rights; certainly, Goodwin says nothing 
to the contrary. But if this is so, then it cannot be said that the woman victimized by 
rape “took any action” at all. Rather, she was acted upon. Again, also, going out on the 
street, or, even, entirely innocently sitting at home behind locked doors, “no matter the 
precaution taken” might result in a rape. This point of Goodwin’s carries far less weight 
than he thinks it does. If staying at home or going out of one’s home carries this risk, 
and the woman has therefore “acted,” then, according to this author, she is “responsible.” 
Reductio ad absurdum, anyone?
3.5.  There is no contract
Goodwin maintains that it is indeed possible to have a contract with a baby, or 
a fetus. He quotes a legal authority to the effect that: “For most contracts, the general 
rule is that while it’s not illegal to enter into a contract with a minor, the contract is 
voidable at the discretion of the minor. Voidable contracts are usually valid contracts 
and are binding unless the child cancels it.” But this seems to stretch the meaning of a 
“contract” so far as to rend it asunder. A “minor” of, oh, eight or twelve years old is one 
thing. A fetus, is quite another.
3.6.  The mother can change her mind
I can readily go along with Goodwin on this, if there is an iron clad contract 
between two parties, and one of them has already paid the other. This is the example 
offered by Rothbard regarding Smith and Jones; the former lends to the latter, and/or 
delivers a good to be paid for later.22 Then, there is a clear case of theft when the second 
party reneges.  But the relation between mother and baby is so far removed from that 
type of situation as to make reliance on it completely invalid.  Even if there were an 
22  See below under topic ten.
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invitation from the mother to the unborn baby, which there is not, people are allowed, 
at least under libertarian law, to change their minds regarding them. Of course, you 
may not invite someone for a sea cruise, and then, 500 miles from shore, change your 
mind about the invitation and ask the guest to leave. Here, there is an implicit contract 
that the host will leave the guest in no worse position, vis a vis his life expectancy, than 
before the invitation was made. But, again, it is a herculean stretch to equate that with 
the relation of mother and fetus. In any case, the fetus is not created until some time 
after sexual intercourse is completed. There is no small human being inside the womb 
until the sperm enters the egg several minutes afterward. Thus, at the time of the con-
gress between man and woman, there is no fetus yet in existence who can possibly be 
“invited.”
3.7.  Evictionism
The underlying idea behind evictionism is that the unwanted zygote is a tres-
passer, no matter how he ended up in the womb, and the mother, the owner of her 
body, has a right to evict, but not murder, this young interloper.
Goodwin disagrees: “I find no trespass.  How is one trespassing when one was 
invited?  When the party host extended the invitation, she knew it would be for a nine-
-month visit with no possible way for the guest to depart in the meantime.  The unborn 
child was invited by the action of the woman for just such a term.” There are problems 
here. First, there was no invitation. Certainly, not in the case of rape.  Second, even if 
there was an invitation, which there most certainly was not, it need not be for a “nine-
-month visit.” Contrary to Goodwin, the baby is viable outside the womb at the seventh 
month. Why not an invitation for a week or so, or a month at most? Where is it written 
that all pregnant women offer invitations for three quarters of a year?23
It is at this point that Goodwin commits a philosophical howler. He starts off by 
quoting from: “The position put forth here, in contrast, is one of eviction not of killing. 
However, if the only way to evict is by killing the fetus, then the woman’s right to her 
property - that is, her womb - must be held above the valuable life of the fetus.”24
He then continues: “There is significant fault with this assertion.  Even if one 
grants Block’s position, Rothbard suggests that property rights can be legitimately de-
fended only proportionately: ‘The victim, then, has the right to exact punishment up to 
the proportional amount as determined by the extent of the crime…’”
23  I pick up a hitch-hiker in New Orleans. He wants to go to Los Angeles. I agree to take him there. But then 
when we get to Houston, I change my mind and ask him to leave. Have I committed a crime? Not any that 
would be recognized by a libertarian court.
24  BLOCK, Walter E.; WHITEHEAD, Roy. Compromising the Uncompromisable: A Private Property Rights Approa-
ch to Resolving the Abortion Controversy. Appalachian Journal of Law, Grundy, vol. 4, n. 1,  2005.
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The mistake is to equate defense and punishment. Not only in libertarian law is 
the victim able to do much more to protect himself during the commission of the crime 
than the court may do after the fact, if it supports the libertarian notion of proportional 
punishment. While the crime is being committed, the victim has no idea as to whether 
or not deadly force will be used by the perpetrator. The latter may only want to steal a 
can of beer, but the grocer cannot know that. Thus, he is entitled to kill the intruder.  In 
contrast, it would not be a civilized court that would impose the death penalty for such 
petty theft.
Whereupon this author offers a very important challenge to libertarian theo-
rists. He asks: “Is a shopkeeper justified in shooting a six-year-old child in the back while 
the child is escaping with a one-dollar candy bar?  It seems Block and Whitehead would 
say yes.  After all, it is the shopkeeper’s property rights in question.  Does the six-year-
-olds’ aggression justify any and every level of violence by the shopkeeper in defending 
his one-dollar candy bar?” I speak only for myself when I say that the only time this 
would be justified is if the only way the shopkeeper could stop the theft is by shooting. 
For example, he might be a paraplegic with only the trigger finger functioning. For the 
libertarian, property rights are sacrosanct. We cannot support children stealing candy 
bars; if we do, utilitarian point coming up, the practice will become widespread. Assu-
ming the child is young enough not to constitute a threat, the mighty presumption is 
that the able-bodied property owner will be able to stop the theft with far less violence 
than the proverbial shot in the back; certainly, such a baby constitutes no threat of bo-
dily harm. The reason he may do so to an adult, or, even, an armed child, is that, then, 
there is a threat of dire consequences, and if property rights are to be upheld, then 
force, yes, deadly force, is justified.
3.8.  Rights of the unborn child
In this short section our author likens the relationship of mother and unborn 
baby to that between landlord and tenant. This seems like a bit of a stretch, even for 
Goodwin, since the former never signed a lease, no monthly fees were ever paid, etc.
3.9.  Causation
My protagonist here maintains that the woman was a causal agent in her preg-
nancy, and that people are always responsible for what they cause; in effect they must 
set things right; be accountable, answerable for what they unleash.  He states: “Here 
I speak to causation not in the abortive act (although this could be used to counter 
Block’s “evictionism” argument), but in conception.  The woman’s “conduct” during in-
tercourse brought on the “result” of pregnancy.  It is difficult to accept that the woman 
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somehow has no responsibility at all for the pregnancy (and therefore, the unborn 
child) directly caused by her conduct.” 
There is so much wrong here it is hard to know where to begin. Let us start with 
the fact that the other day I purchased an apple. I’m a relatively big eater of this fruit. 
This “caused” the price of apples to rise. My “conduct” thus “resulted” in the fact that 
some other person, a marginal consumer, got priced out of the market and could no 
longer afford to make a purchase he otherwise would have made. I am thus “responsib-
le” for this “conduct” of mine. The implication  would appear to be that I owe this person 
an apple, or, at the very least, an amount of money equal to the difference between 
what he would have paid for it in the absence of my “conduct” and with its presence. 
“Preposterous” would appear the only possible response to any such claim, however. 
Or, take another case. You don’t ask the ugly girl to dance at the party. As a “result” she 
commits suicide. You “caused” this, you dirty rat, you. Contrary to fact conditional sti-
pulated: had you asked her for even one dance, she would have been a happy camper, 
very far removed from doing herself in. My response to all of this? Cause schmause. 
Causing something may well be necessary for having committed a crime, but it is cer-
tainly not sufficient, as Goodwin’s analysis would have it.
3.10.  Reasonable reliance (on promises)
Rothbard  discusses the “title-transfer” theory of contracts as follows: 
Suppose that Smith and Jones make a contract, Smith giving $1000 to Jones at the pre-
sent moment, in exchange for an IOU of Jones, agreeing to pay Smith $1100 one year 
from now. This is a typical debt contract. What has happened is that Smith has trans-
ferred his title to ownership of $1000 at present in exchange for Jones agreeing now to 
transfer title to Smith of $1100 one year from now. Suppose that, when the appointed 
date arrives one year later, Jones refuses to pay. Why should this payment now be enfor-
ceable at libertarian law? Existing law (which will be dealt with in greater detail below) 
largely contends that Jones must pay $1100 because he has “promised” to pay, and that 
this promise set up in Smith’s mind the “expectation” that he would receive the money.
Our contention here is that mere promises are not a transfer of property title; that while it 
may well be the moral thing to keep one’s promises, that it is not and cannot be the func-
tion of law (i.e., legal violence) in a libertarian system to enforce morality (in this case the 
keeping of promises). Our contention here is that Jones must pay Smith $1100 because 
he had already agreed to transfer title, and that nonpayment means that Jones is a thief, 
that he has stolen the property of Smith. In short, Smith’s original transfer of the $1000 
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was not absolute, but conditional, conditional on Jones paying the $1100 in a year, and 
that, therefore, the failure to pay is an implicit theft of Smith’s rightful property.
Let us examine, on the other hand, the implications of the now prevalent ‘promise’ or 
‘expectations’ theory of contracts. Suppose that A promises to marry B; B proceeds to 
make wedding plans, incurring costs of preparing for the wedding. At the last minute, 
A changes his or her mind, thereby violating this alleged ‘contract.’ What should be the 
role of a legal enforcing agency in the libertarian society? Logically, the strict believer in 
the ‘promise’ theory of contracts would have to reason as follows: A voluntarily promised 
B that he or she would marry the other, this set up the expectation of marriage in the 
other’s mind; therefore this contract must be enforced. A must be forced to marry B.
As far as we know, no one has pushed the promise theory this far. Compulsory marriage 
is such a clear and evident form of involuntary slavery that no theorist, let alone any 
libertarian, has pushed the logic to this point. Clearly, liberty and compulsory slavery are 
totally incompatible, indeed are diametric opposites. But why not, if all promises must be 
enforceable contracts?
A milder form of enforcing such marriage promises has, however, been employed, let 
alone advocated, in our legal system. The old ‘breach of promise’ suit forced the violator 
of his promise to pay damages to the promisee, to pay the expenses undergone because 
of the expectations incurred. But while this does not go as far as compulsory slavery, it 
is equally invalid. For there can be no property in someone’s promises or expectations; 
these are only subjective states of mind, which do not involve transfer of title, and the-
refore do not involve implicit theft. They therefore should not be enforceable, and, in re-
cent years, ‘breach of promise’ suits, at least, have ceased to be upheld by the courts. The 
important point is that while enforcement of damages is scarcely as horrendous to the 
libertarian as compulsory enforcement of the promised service, it stems from the same 
invalid principle.25
If this does not put paid to Goodwin’s promises theory, then nothing will.  But 
this author demurs on the following ground: “What would a reasonable person – one 
unable to swim – assume if invited on a nine-month ocean cruise?  Would he reasona-
bly assume this invitation included the possibility that his hostess would throw him 
overboard?
25  ROTHBARD, Murray N. For a New Liberty: The Libertarian Manifesto. Auburn: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1973. 
chapter 19.
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“After receiving an invitation that inherently involved nine months of complete 
– life-and-death – dependency, what would be more reasonable for the unborn child to 
rely upon than he was promised the benefit of the full term in the womb?” 
But there is a hole in this analogy large enough to drive through it the prover-
bial truck. The boat owner explicitly invited the non-swimmer guest on a cruise; the 
mother made no such invitation to the baby.  At the time of intercourse, no fetus yet 
existed. An invitation requires two parties, and inviter and an invitee. Surely, in the case 
of rape there could not have been any invitation at all, not even a poetic one of the 
sort imagined by this author. In the case of the shipping magnate, there was at least an 
implicit understanding that the guest would not be treated in so cavalier a manner. If 
he was, his welfare position would have been worsened, and he would not have agreed 
to embark on the trip in the first place. In the case of the pregnant woman who evicts 
her baby, whether or not it perishes, the latter’s position was improved if we can claim 
that existence even for a short time is better than no existence at all.26 Nor is there any 
question of a not yet existing fetus agreeing to anything.
3.11. A unilateral contract
But Goodwin is not finished yet. Far from it. He brilliantly offers the following 
scenario to overcome the fact that at the time of sexual intercourse, there is no fetus 
(yet) in existence: 
Offering a reward is a typical example of such a contract – a reward is made known to 
the general public.  The counterparty need not be known at the time the contract is offe-
red, yet it is enforceable by the counterparty if properly claimed.  Technically, the coun-
terparty need not even be born or conceived when the offer was made (imagine in 1963 
a fifteen-year-old boy finding Hitler on skis in Bariloche).  Subsequently, someone comes 
to claim the reward: the person who chose to act.  Although he was not the individually 
identified counterparty (at the time of contract there was no specific counter-party), he 
has a contractual right to the reward.
It cannot be denied that this author is ingenious. But, try as he might, he will not 
be able to overcome the case in favor of evictionism. For offering a reward is making 
a promise to pay. There is no contract involved. And, Rothbard’s dismissal of contracts 
as legally27 binding is definitive.  Remember, in a contract, where consideration has 
26  Further, “where there is life there is hope.” Which position would you rather occupy, gentle reader? Never to 
have been conceived at all, or, to have been created, with a chance at life if the mother carries through, or not, 
if she evicts before viability? For those who chose existence, the answer is obvious.
27  Not morally.
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changed hands, reneging amounts to downright theft. No such situation occurs with a 
broken promise.
But will this not end the practice of offering rewards? That is, promising to pay 
any (now unknown person) money or valuable consideration if he fulfills the require-
ment? Not at all. The promisor need only post a bond with a third person, perhaps a 
bank, or a court, to the effect that the person who complies with the mandate of the 
reward shall be paid. Then it is out of the hands of the person who made the promise.28 
Suppose Rothbardianism in this regard were to become the law of the land. Bonds of 
this sort would tend to assure subsequent payment of the reward.
Not only is Goodwin a brilliant libertarian theoretician, he is a poet of no little 
note. Consider the following: 
The woman made an offer; she placed herself in a position of being obligated to a coun-
ter-party that might take her up on her offer.  The unborn child took her up on the offer, 
and can therefore enforce the contract – contracts with minors are enforceable by the 
minor, if the minor chooses to do so; contracts with a minor can only be voided by the 
minor.  I suspect the unborn child would choose to enforce the contract.
Yes, these words are beautiful. But they avail his side of the argument nothing 
when the rubber hits the road. No, the woman never made her (not yet existing) fetus 
an offer.29 This claim is poetic only. In real terms, preposterous. No, the unborn child 
most certainly did not “take her up on her offer.” Only in sublime poetry can non-exis-
tent entities “take any one up” on anything. There was no “contract” between them, ex-
cept poetically. Unborn children are not yet capable of “choosing” anything, except in 
fairy tales. The soon to be mother offered a “reward” to her soon to be created baby? 
This is but the product of a very fertile imagination.
3.12. Lease
If any plain old ordinary contract is nonsense, then a real estate lease is nonsen-
se on stilts. And, yet, Goodwin sees “The mother as landlord and the unborn child as 
tenant have entered into a lease – a fixed-term tenancy, with the term tied to a specific 
event: birth.  Such a lease term was recognized in common law.” When, ever, did the 
“tenant” pay rent to the “landlord”? Never, that is when.
28  But are we not, merely, placing the problem at one remove, attempting, as it were, to sweep it under the 
carpet? No. For this third party would be contractually obligated insofar as the reward giver is concerned, to 
make the money available to anyone complying with the stipulations of the reward. If this third party reneged, 
he would in effect be stealing money from the person who offered the reward, in much the same way, in Ro-
thbard’s example, as Jones stole from Smith.  
29  This holds in spades for the woman who is pregnant as a result of rape, who’s fetus has every right enjoyed 
by any other not yet born infant.
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Our author asks: “Can the landlord evict the tenant without cause?  I have re-
viewed several typical real estate lease contracts, and find nothing to suggest this is so.” 
If there is a signed lease by both parties, then, of course, neither can abrogate it without 
the other’s permission. But this business of “without cause” stems from the realm of rent 
control. There, the landlord would like nothing better than to evict the tenant who is 
paying below market rent.30 But the law will not allow the property owner to do any 
such thing, lest this totally undermine the rent control system at the outset.
3.13.  Covenant of quiet enjoyment
Borrowing heavily, again, from real estate law, Goodwin requires of “the landlord 
(the mother)” that she provide her tenant, the baby, with quiet enjoyment of the premi-
ses she has rented out to him. Certainly, he avers, this would feature the exclusion of “an 
abortion doctor from the premises” as this be the very opposite of “peace and quiet” for 
the tenant. But it would include much more. Under this “agreement,” presumably, the 
mother would not be allowed to drink alcohol, smoke cigarettes, engage in strenuous 
sporting events, fail to get plenty of rest, etc. There is no objection to the fact that ethi-
cally speaking, these are all required. But Goodwin would make this a matter of law, 
libertarian law. One wonders how many mothers would be willing to sign a “real estate” 
“contract” of this sort.
4.  MOSQUITO
Mr. Mosquito31 “agrees with the vast majority of Walter Block’s positions on the 
application of the non-aggression principle to the various concerns of the humans that 
inhabit this planet.” I am pleased and proud to acknowledge the inverse. I regard this 
scholar as one of the most gifted libertarian theoreticians now active on a whole host of 
issues related to the NAP. Moreover, I am impressed that he should use specific perfor-
mance contracts, something on which we both agree, against my views on evictionism. 
What are specific performance contracts? These are agreements when the em-
ployee must carry through on the performance mentioned in the contract. For exam-
ple, A hires B to sing at his wedding. B changes his mind. A is legally entitled to compel 
B to engage in that act.  The most extreme case of this would be the voluntary slave 
contract. B sells himself to A as a slave. A now has the legal right to whip B for any rea-
son. If B calls the police and accuses A of assault and battery and given that this specific 
performance contract is legal, then the police will not and may not come to the aid of B. 
30  Either he can rent it to another tenant at a higher rate, if allowed by law, or, convert it to a more remunerative 
purpose, typically sell it as a condominium.
31  Another gifted libertarian who writes under a pseudonym whose identity I decline to reveal. 
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If B attempts to run away from A, the police will properly bring B back into the custody 
of A.32 
Mosquito, who agrees with me on the validity of such contracts, brilliantly at-
tempts to employ them against my evictionist position. He argues that the fetus has a 
32  Virtually all libertarians oppose specific performance contracts, and, certainly slave contracts as mentioned 
above. Here is but the tip of the iceberg in this regard: BARNETT, Randy E. Contract Remedies and Inalienable 
Rights. Social Philosophy & Policy, Cambridge, vol. 4, issue 1, p. 179-202, sept./dec. 1986; BARNETT, Randy 
E. The Structure of Liberty: Justice and the Rule of Law, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988; CALABRESI, Guido; 
MELAMED, Douglas. Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral. Harvard Law 
Review, Cambridge, vol. 85, n. 6, p. 1089-1128, apr. 1972.; EPSTEIN, Richard.  Why Restrain Alienation. Colum-
bia Law Review, New York, vol. 85, p. 971-990, 1985; EVERS, Williamson. Toward a Reformulation of the Law 
of Contracts. Journal of Libertarian Studies, Auburn, vol. 1, p. 3-13, jan./mar. 1977; GORDON, David.  Private 
Property’s Philosopher. The Mises Review, Auburn, vol. 5, n. 1, p. 1-7, mar./june 1999; KINSELLA, N. Stephan. 
Inalienability and Punishment: A Reply to George Smith. Journal of Libertarian Studies, Auburn, vol. 14, n. 
1, p. 79-93, dec./mar. 1998-99; KINSELLA, N. Stephan. A Libertarian Theory of Contract: Title Transfer, Binding 
Promises, and Inalienability. Journal of Libertarian Studies, Auburn, vol. 17, n. 2, p. 11-37, mar./june 2003; 
KRONMAN, Anthony. Paternalism and the Law of Contracts. Yale Law Journal, New Haven, vol. 92, 1983; KU-
FLIK, Arthur. The Inalienability of Autonomy. Philosophy and Public Affairs, New Jersey, vol. 13, n. 4, p. 271-
298, mar./june 1984; KUFLIK, Arthur. The Utilitarian Logic of Inalienable Rights. Ethics, [s.l.], vol. 97, p. 75-87, oct. 
1986; MCCONNELL, Terrance. The Nature and Basis of Inalienable Rights. Law and Philosophy, [s.l.], vol. 3, n. 
1,  p. 25-59, 1984; MCCONNELL, Terrance. The Inalienable Right of Conscience: A Madisonian Argument. Social 
Theory & Practice, [s.l.], vol. 22, issue 3, p. 397-416, mar./june 1996; RADIN, Margaret Jane. Time, Possession 
and Alienation. Washington University Law Quarterly, Washington, vol. 64, n. 3, p.739-758, 1986; RADIN, 
Margaret Jane. 1987. Market-Inalienability. Harvard Law Review, Cambridge, vol. 100, n. 8, p. 1849-1937, june 
1987; REISMAN, George. Capitalism. Ottawa: Jameson Books, 1996. p. 455, 634-636; RICHMAN, Sheldon. Slaves 
contracts and the inalienable will. The Libertarian Forum, Auburn, p. 4-5, jul./aug., 1978. Available at: <http://
mises.org/journals/lf/1978/1978_07-08.pdf>; ROTHBARD, Murray N. The Ethics of Liberty. Atlantic Highlands: 
Humanities Press, 1998; SMITH, George. A Killer’s Right to Life. Liberty, [s.l.], vol. 10, n. 2, p. 46-54, nov. 1996; 
SMITH, George. Inalienable Rights? Liberty, [s.l.], vol. 10, n. 6, p. 51-?, jul. 1997. 
However, there are a few counter examples: ANDERSSON, Anna-Karin. An alleged contradiction in Nozick’s enti-
tlement theory. Journal of Libertarian Studies, Auburn, vol. 21, n. 3, p. 43–63, mar./june 2007;  BLOCK, Walter 
E.. Voluntary Slavery. The Libertarian Connection, [s.l.], vol. I, n. 3, p. 9-11, apr. 1969; BLOCK, Walter E. Book 
review of Nancy C. Baker, Baby Selling: the Scandal of Black Market Adoptions, New York: The Vanguard Press, 
1978. Libertarian Review, San Francisco, vol. 7, n. 12, p. 44-45, jan. 1979; BLOCK, Walter E. Market Inalienability 
Once Again: Reply to Radin. Thomas Jefferson Law Journal, San Diego, vol. 22, n. 1, p. 37-88, mar./june 1999; 
BLOCK, Walter E. Alienability, Inalienability, Paternalism and the Law: Reply to Kronman. American Journal 
of Criminal Law, Austi, vol. 28, n. 3, p. 351-371, june/sept. 2001; BLOCK, Walter E. Toward a Libertarian Theory 
of Inalienability: A Critique of Rothbard, Barnett, Gordon, Smith, Kinsella and Epstein. Journal of Libertarian 
Studies, Auburn, vol.17, n. 2, p. 39-85, mar./june 2003; BLOCK, Walter E. Ayn Rand and Austrian Economics: Two 
Peas in a Pod. The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies, University Park (PA), vol. 6, n. 2, p. 259-269, mar./june 2005; 
BLOCK, Walter E. Epstein on alienation: a rejoinder. International Journal of Social Economics, [s.l.], vol. 33, n. 
3-4, p. 241-260, 2006; BLOCK, Walter E. Alienability: Reply to Kuflik. Humanomics, [s.l.], vol. 23, n. 3, p. 117-136, 
2007; BLOCK, Walter E. Yes, Sell Rivers! And Make Legal Some Slave Contracts. The Tyee,, Victoria, Opinion, 
July 25 2009. Available at: http://thetyee.ca/Opinion/2009/07/24/SellRivers/; BLOCK, Walter E. Privatizing Rivers 
and Voluntary Slave Contracts. Lew Rock Well, [s.l.], July 27 2009, Available at: <http://www.lewrockwell.com/
block/block134.html>; FREDERICK, Danny. Voluntary Slavery. Las Torres de Lucca, Madrid, vol. 3, n. 4, p. 115-
137, ene./jun. 2014; KERSHNAR, Stephen. A Liberal Argument for Slavery. Journal of Social Philosophy, [s.l.], 
vol. 34, n. 4, p. 510-536, 2003; LESTER, Jan Clifford. Escape from Leviathan. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000; 
MOSQUITO, Bionic. Walter Block, Specific Performance Contracts, and Abortion. July 12 2015. Available at: 
<http://bionicmosquito.blogspot.com/2015/07/walter-block-specific-performance.html>; MOSQUITO, Bionic. 
The Sanctity of Contract. April 19 2014. Available at: <http://bionicmosquito.blogspot.com/2014/04/the-sanc-
tity-of-contract.html>; NOZICK, Robert. Anarchy, State and Utopia. New York: Basic Books, 1974. p. 58; 283; 
331; STEINER, Hillel. An Essay on Rights. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1994. p. 232; THOMSON, Judith Jarvis. 
The Realm of Rights. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990 p. 283-284.
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right to insist that the mother engage in the specific performance she had contractually 
obligated to undertake, that is, “house” him safely for the usual nine month duration. 
Specifically he maintains: “I suggest that the unborn child has the right to the use of the 
womb for the term of the pregnancy.  The mother owns the womb (obviously), but the 
child is a tenant, if you will; a tenant who in no way breached the lease agreement…” 
Mosquito refers to “Block’s … (view) …  regarding specific performance contracts – 
outlining the right of the counter-party to demand specific performance if the first par-
ty has a change of heart…. he disagrees with those in the libertarian community who 
suggest that such contracts are invalid within the framework of the NAP.  He believes 
that enforcement of the terms of a specific performance contract is perfectly legitimate 
within libertarian theory… What does this have to do with abortion?  One of the types 
of contracts upon which I make my case regarding the unborn child’s rights to occupy 
the womb for the term of the pregnancy – and against the possibility of eviction – is a 
specific performance contract.”
This attempt to hoist me by my own petard is insightful. However, I contend, it 
fails. It is predicated upon there being a specific performance or any other contract in 
existence between mother and baby. In my response to Goodwin, supra, I outline my 
reasons for doubting the existence of any such contract between these two “parties.”
Mosquito concludes his short essay on this note: “If the mother changes her 
mind – as Rothbard suggests she has every right to do – it will cause irreparable harm to 
the unborn child.  Money damages will most certainly not be sufficient for the benefit 
of the now-dead unborn child.  The counter-party (the unborn child) would be entitled 
to equitable relief, including specific performance, and such relief shall not be oppo-
sed.  What specific performance would the unborn child demand?  It is not difficult to 
imagine the answer.
Similar language is included in many contracts today, and one would expect in this most 
one-sided contract between mother and unborn child – where the party that set the 
terms of the contract could then break the contract and realize a gain while the cou-
nter-party suffers death – it seems reasonable that the expectation would be not less 
than what is standard in every-day commercial agreements – for exchanges much less 
significant than life and death.
However, again, this entire line of reasoning, brilliant as it is, founders on the fact 
that there is no contract, there can be no contract, of any kind, between mother and 
the sperm and the egg, which are the only entities that exist at the time of voluntary 
sexual intercourse. Even if we posit that there can be a contract between the mother 
and the pre-born infant, an entirely heroic assumption this is not sufficient to support 
the Mosquito’s contention.




Sadowsky33 is a response to Block34.  Although both were published several de-
cades ago, each is an integral part of the libertarian literature on abortion, and thus part 
and parcel of the present treatment.
This author objects to the evictionist thesis on the ground that most abortions 
do not fit this model: “What is wanted in most cases is precisely the death of the child. 
Most of those seeking abortions would be horrified at the thought that the child might 
survive his expulsion.” Here, Sadowsky does not realize it, but he and I have no disagre-
ement at all. Remember, abortion is the combination of two very different acts: separa-
tion, which may or may not be compatible with the viability of the fetus outside of the 
womb, it all depends upon which month this occurs; and, something altogether dissi-
milar: the actual killing (murder!) of the baby. It is precisely the essence of evictionism 
that while the first aspect of this double edged act is justified, the second part most 
certainly is not. The point is that in the first two trimesters, evictionism and pro-choice 
have the same effect, albeit for different underlying reasons: the fetus dies. In the third 
trimester, evictionism and the pro-life philosophy overlap in terms of practical results, if 
not philosophical underpinnings: the baby lives. And, as medical technology marches 
ever onward, evictionism comes more and more to resemble the pro-life position, at 
least in terms of whether the fetus survives or not. That is, for every ten or twenty years 
of new medical technology that passes, the fetus will be viable outside of the womb a 
few days earlier.  Perhaps in 50 years from now, the fetus may be able to live outside the 
womb as early as its sixth month of existence; maybe in 100 years, in the fifth month. 
Does anyone doubt that in a century or two, or a millennium or so for the pessimists, 
the womb will no longer be needed to support the fertilized egg at all?
Sadowsky then asks: 
Does the mere fact that a man is a stowaway justify our throwing him out of the air-
craft? Ought we not in the absence of overriding reasons to wait until the aircraft lands? 
Both traditional natural law theory and the common law have it that our response to 
aggression should be proportionate to our need to resist and the nature of the attack. 
Suppose that the inflicting of a lethal wound is the only way to recover a stolen nickel. Is 
that enough to justify such an act?
Consider the stowaway first. He is a danger to the airplane owner. Who knows 
of what malicious acts he is capable. But, let us place this case in the best light possible. 
33  SADOWSKY, James. Abortion and Rights of the Child. The Libertarian Forum, Auburn. p. 2-3, jul./aug. 1978. 
Available at: <http://mises.org/journals/lf/1978/1978_07-08.pdf>.
34  BLOCK, Walter E. Toward a Libertarian Theory of Abortion. The Libertarian Forum, Auburn, vol. 10, n. 9, p. 
6-8, sept. 1977.
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He is unconscious.35 Better yet, and more analogous, he is a totally innocent stowaway, 
who has been drugged and placed in your airplane by an evil gang. Then, does he not 
have a right to be expelled only after the landing of the plane? Whether or not this 
is true, the analogy with the baby, the purpose to which Sadowsky is employing this 
example, does not hold. For there is all the world of difference between trespassing 
into an airplane, and into the body of a person. Rothbard says this very dramatically: 
“… just as an assault on someone’s body is a more heinous crime than the theft of his 
property, so the trespassing on or within a person’s body is a far more heinous trespass 
than merely strolling on his land or stowing away on an aircraft.”36
Then, too, Sadowsky is guilty of the error of equating what may be done to the 
perpetrator when he is in the act of committing his dastardly crime, on the one hand, 
with how he may be properly punished afterward, when in the clutches of the law. 
Proportionality may well apply in the latter case, but certainly not in the former. Then, 
all bets are off. The victim may use deadly force to protect himself, and, I would add, 
his property, down to and including nickels stolen from him, forsooth.37 Sadowsky, as 
a libertarian, accepts the centrality to this philosophy of the NAP. But, what good does 
this concept do if an owner may not use force to protect his five cent coin? Either we 
have the NAP or we do not. If we do, we may not only own property, but defend it too.
Again, Sadowsky confuses abortion and eviction when he writes: “… the foetus 
does not die as the result of the mother’s failure to extend the means of life – it dies of 
the attack itself.” True, always, for abortion, but this holds, for eviction, only in the first six 
months of the pregnancy. In the last three months, the fetus need not perish. Indeed, it 
can survive outside of the womb in this stage of development.
We cannot ignore two more of Rothbard’s salient critiques of Sadowsky. Says 
the first: 
… even if the foetus is considered to be human, no human has the right to reside unwa-
nted within the body of another.” And, with regard to Thomson’s victim of the violinist: “I 
say that you would have the right, not merely to unplug yourself from his kidneys, but to 
be damned ‘brutal’ about it if necessary to get your body out of its enslavement, even if it 
kills the pianist in the process.38
However, I must demur from Rothbard when he avers: 
35  The unconscious stowaway can wake up at any time, and create havoc, even more dangerous in the air.  We 
can then stipulate that this worthy is placed in handcuffs, and thus can perpetrate no harm.
36  ROTHBARD, Murray N. The editor replies. The Libertarian Forum, Auburn, p. 3, jul./aug. 1978. Available at: 
<http://mises.org/journals/lf/1978/1978_07-08.pdf>.
37  Although see the discussion of the paraplegic mentioned supra, in the discussion of Goodwin’s point 7.
38  ROTHBARD, Murray N. The editor replies. The Libertarian Forum, Auburn, p. 3, jul./aug. 1978. Available at: 
<http://mises.org/journals/lf/1978/1978_07-08.pdf>.
Revista de Investigações Constitucionais, Curitiba, vol. 4, n. 1, p. 11-41, jan./abr. 2017.
Walter E. Block
30 
It seems to me that the problem with the Block-Sadowsky thesis of asserting the foetus 
to be human is that that act of birth, which I had always naively assumed to be an event 
of considerable importance in everyone’s life, now takes on hardly more stature than the 
onset of adolescence or of one’s ‘mid-life crisis.’ Does birth really confer no rights?” My 
response is, No, birth really confers no rights; none, in any case, not owned by the fetus 
five minutes before birth. Further, this event is of far less importance than “the onset of 
adolescence or of one’s ‘mid-life crisis.’39
Rather, it is akin to a mere change of address, for that is all that happens in the 
few seconds before and after birth: a change of address, slight in the geographical sen-
se, momentous insofar as dependency on the mother is concerned.
6.  VANCE
In this section I respond to Vance40; I consider them in reverse order. Vance’s 
2012 article is entitled “Libertarianism and Abortion.” He and I both favor the former 
and oppose the latter. One wonders, then, why I would include his fascinating and very 
important contributions to this vexing issue since we seem to be in full agreement, if 
it is not my goal to merely to underscore everything he writes about it. However, our 
agreement is more apparent than real.  About libertarianism, itself, nothing more need 
be said. We are fully congruent on that issue; I am an enthusiastic supporter of his views 
on that issue. 
But he and I oppose abortion for very different reasons. In his case, it is because 
he is pro-life. In mine, it is because I make a sharp distinction between abortion, which 
combines eviction with outright and downright murder, and eviction alone. I oppose 
abortion not due to the first aspect (eviction) of this complex act, but rather the second 
(murder). Vance’s stance on eviction, as distinct from abortion, is ambiguous. He states: 
“… how far along the pregnancy has to be …” so as to justify for eviction a criminal 
penalty “… are things that would have to be determined that I don’t profess to have 
precise answers to. But this is precisely the point of contention between evictionists 
and pro-lifers. Thus this author therein declares himself in effect an agnostic on evictio-
nism, not an opponent of this philosophy. Nevertheless, a careful study of his essential 
deliberations on this subject will pay great dividends.
39  ROTHBARD, Murray N. The editor replies. The Libertarian Forum, Auburn, p. 3, jul./aug. 1978. Available at: 
<http://mises.org/journals/lf/1978/1978_07-08.pdf>.
40  VANCE, Laurence. Is Ron Paul Wrong on Abortion? Lew Rock Well, [s.l.], January 29 2008. Available at: http://
archive.lewrockwell.com/vance/vance133.html; VANCE, Laurence. Libertarianism and Abortion. Lew Rock Well, 
[s.l.], July 17 2012. Available at: <http://archive.lewrockwell.com/vance/vance297.html>.
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Vance starts out on a high note for a libertarian, centering this philosophy on 
the NAP41: “I have argued that because the non-aggression axiom is central to liberta-
rianism, and because force is justified only in self-defense, and because it is wrong to 
threaten or initiate violence against a person or his property, and because killing is the 
ultimate form of aggression that, to be consistent, libertarians should be opposed to 
abortion.”42  Yes, indeed, “libertarians should be opposed to abortion” but not to mere 
eviction, even though, unfortunately, if done too early in the pregnancy, the very hu-
man baby will perish.
Next, consider this statement of Vance’s: 
Because a child in the womb is helpless, not initiating violence, not committing aggres-
sion, and not there of its own accord, I believe that, to be consistent, libertarians should 
not only be opposed to abortion, but in favor of making it a criminal act just like murder, 
rape, kidnapping, theft, assault, and robbery would be in any libertarian society based 
on the non-aggression principle.43
Helpless? Yes. Initiating violence? No, of course not. Not there of its own accord? 
Again, I agree. But the unwanted fetus is still committing aggression, in that he is occu-
pying someone else’s property, against her will. In the case of rape this is all too clear. 
It cannot be denied that such an infant is indeed a trespasser, albeit, of course, one 
lacking mens rea. Yet, all babies, however they were conceived, have equal rights.  If this 
fetus may be ejected, then that applies to all of them. Yes, abortion should be a criminal 
act, but not eviction. In addition to not knowing how to deal with “… how far along the 
pregnancy has to be …” Vance is not sure of the libertarian analysis of rape. But this 
seems very clear to me.  It is unimaginable that such a baby should not be considered 
an interloper by the libertarian, no matter how undeniably innocent he is in terms of 
culpability. Thomson’s violinist is equally innocent, and at one and the same time, an 
interloper.
Vance continues his analysis: 
… although a fetus is a parasite in the sense that it lives inside, is dependent upon, and 
obtains nutriments from a host, I hasten to point out that a newborn baby is totally de-
pendent upon someone to feed and take care of it as well. Even a six-month-old baby left 
to itself will soon die. Is it okay to just throw parasitical children in the trash with aborted 
41  Quite properly, Vance quotes Mr. Libertarian on this matter, Murray Rothbard, and is even kind enough to 
include my own forays into this issue. He characterizes me as “Rothbard’s disciple” and no truer words were 
ever said.
42  VANCE, Laurence. Libertarianism and Abortion. Lew Rock Well, [s.l.], July 17 2012. Available at: <http://
archive.lewrockwell.com/vance/vance297.html>.
43  VANCE, Laurence. Libertarianism and Abortion. Lew Rock Well, [s.l.], July 17 2012. Available at: <http://
archive.lewrockwell.com/vance/vance297.html>.
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babies? A child in the womb a week before birth is just as much a parasite as a child in 
the womb six months before birth. Are libertarians who advocate abortion on demand 
ready to allow the procedure at any time before birth in the name of consistency?44
Dependency is an entirely different matter than parasitism. We can readily ack-
nowledge that the newborn and the preborn baby are equally dependent upon adult 
care. And the same applies to the fetus in all stages of its development. But it is not true 
that the post birth baby is at all a parasite, as is the (unwanted) one in the womb. As a 
libertarian, I do not at all advocate “abortion on demand” but I do maintain that eviction 
“on demand” is compatible with this philosophy. Nothing stated by Vance so far is ne-
cessarily at variance with such a conclusion, although he certainly does not explicitly 
support such a stance.
But all this changes with his perspective, which is now incompatible with evic-
tionism: “When a woman engages in an activity the natural consequence of which is 
pregnancy, she is obligating herself to bring to term a completely separate individual 
with uniquely different DNA that didn’t choose to ‘invade’ her body or ‘aggress’ against 
her.” Does the woman victimized by rape “engage” in sexual intercourse? This is unclear. 
If so, then she certainly does not “obligate” herself to anything. As for the female who 
voluntarily chooses to participate in this act, she no more obligates herself to anything 
at all, any more than does Thomson’s woman who opens a door or window and thus 
makes it easier for the burglar to attack her. The “natural consequence” of a woman who 
walks out alone, unescorted by a male relative in some Arab countries, is to be raped, 
and perhaps impregnated. The “natural consequence” of a female who dresses in revea-
ling clothing is much the same in such nations. And, yet, at least according to libertarian 
law, she has every right to do so, and is not “obligating” herself to anything at all.45
Let us now return to Vance.46 He starts off with an interesting choice.  Liberta-
rians fall into two groups:
• I support Ron Paul even though he is wrong on abortion.
• I don’t support Ron Paul because he is wrong on abortion.
I clearly belong in the first camp. Block is in effect my love letter to this magni-
ficent libertarian who is staunchly, and mistakenly, in the pro-life camp.47 It is no exag-
geration to say that I revere this man, and, yet, respectfully, part company from him on 
this issue.
Vance then makes a second important bifurcation: 
44  VANCE, Laurence. Libertarianism and Abortion. Lew Rock Well, [s.l.], July 17 2012. Available at: <http://
archive.lewrockwell.com/vance/vance297.html>.
45  With the exception, of course, of she herself acting in accordance with the NAP. That is her only obligation.
46  VANCE, Laurence. Is Ron Paul Wrong on Abortion? Lew Rock Well, [s.l.], January 29 2008. Available at: 
<http://archive.lewrockwell.com/vance/vance133.html>.
47  BLOCK, Walter E. Yes to Ron Paul and Liberty. New York: Ishi Press, 2012.
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There are two kinds of “pro-choice” libertarians. The first recognizes that abortion is not 
a settled issue in the libertarian community and therefore hesitates to castigate fellow 
libertarians who oppose abortion as anti-libertarian or unlibertarian. They are civil, 
amiable, and likable  —  like Walter Block…
The second, and more vocal, group of these libertarians is made up of those who are 
adamant in their belief that opposition to abortion is anti-libertarian or unlibertarian. 
When a radical, pro-abortion feminist makes a statement like ‘fetuses are parasites who 
derive all their nutrients from the bodies of their hosts, and quite often pose to their hosts 
serious health complications and risks. Any woman carrying a fetus is being generous,’ it 
doesn’t surprise me in the least. But some ‘pro-choice’ libertarians make statements that 
are just as outrageous.48
I greatly regret this, but, I must repay Vance’s kindness here with a slight criti-
cism. First, although I readily accept and am grateful for the “civil, amiable, and likable”49 
I am not at all “pro-choice.” I am an evictionist – the compromise position between that 
and pro-life.” Second, I am very “adamant”50 that both the pro-choice and the pro- life 
positions are incompatible with libertarianism.
Vance list several statements of Ron Paul eloquently espousing and defending 
the pro-life philosophy, including the statement that the “sanctity of life is crucial for the 
continuation of a civilized society.” Vance then asks: 
Why would a libertarian have a problem with these statements? Why should it be con-
sidered libertarian to kill a baby in the womb or unlibertarian to oppose such killing? 
And even worse, why would a libertarian say that it was unlibertarian to advocate killing 
foreigners in an aggressive war but not non-libertarian to kill a baby in the womb?51
Let me attempt to answer this crie de cour. It is unlibertarian to kill innocent 
foreigners, who never came close to, or even had the power to, attack our country. But, 
an unwanted “baby in the womb” is a trespasser, harsh as this may sound. The easy case 
is the infant who is the product of rape. It is hard to deny he is a parasite, albeit a totally 
innocent one. 
48  VANCE, Laurence. Is Ron Paul Wrong on Abortion? Lew Rock Well, [s.l.], January 29 2008. Available at: 
<http://archive.lewrockwell.com/vance/vance133.html>.
49  I regard Vance in exactly the same way
50  Hopefully, in a civil, amiable, and likable manner
51  VANCE, Laurence. Is Ron Paul Wrong on Abortion? Lew Rock Well, [s.l.], January 29 2008. Available at: 
<http://archive.lewrockwell.com/vance/vance133.html>.
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Next, Vance list several comments from libertarians who favor abortion.52 The 
gist, here, is that “a fetus is not really a human being”53 compelling a woman to bear a 
child against her will amounts to enslaving her54 and overriding her right to self-defen-
se. This author invokes the NAP in behalf of forcing the woman to bring the infant to 
term, even against her will, and emotionally and tellingly cites Murray Rothbard, truly 
“the twentieth century’s greatest proponent of it.”  Vance neglects to mention that Ro-
thbard is a staunch defender of the pro-choice view. Now, it may well be that “Mr. Liber-
tarian” is inconsistent in these two stances of his.55 But Vance does not say this.
Let us consider one last point made by Vance. He opines: 
Killing someone is the ultimate form of aggression. Especially a helpless, defenseless fe-
tus that is only guilty of suddenly waking up in a womb. The fetus certainly had no con-
trol over being a parasite, aggressing against a woman, invading a woman’s body, or ad-
ding unwanted pounds to his host – but its mother certainly did. If an unborn child is not 
entitled to protection of life, then to be consistent, libertarians should have no problem 
with the abortion of a fetus from one month old to nine months old. The nine-month old 
fetus is no more viable than the one-month old one.56
I agree, of course, that “the fetus certainly had no control over being a parasite, 
aggressing against a woman, invading a woman’s body.” However, it is not true that 
“its mother certainly did” have this control. Not so, in the case of rape. Nor can I agree 
that the fetus of one, and nine months, development should be placed in the same 
category. If both are evicted, not aborted, the former will die, but not the latter. This is a 
gargantuan difference, one which brings evictionism into sharp focus.
52  At: VANCE, Laurence. Is Ron Paul Wrong on Abortion? Lew Rock Well, [s.l.], January 29 2008. Available at: 
<http://archive.lewrockwell.com/vance/vance133.html>.(Which I adamantly do not)
53  In my view, the fertilized egg is a rights-bearing person.
54  Contrary to the New York Times, I actually oppose slavery. See on this BLOCK, Walter E. Reply to the Scurri-
lous, Libelous, Venomous, Scandalous New York Times Smear Campaign. Lew Rock Well, [s.l.], January 30 2014.
55  It is my view that Rothbard is logically consistent in upholding the NAP and taking a pro-choice point of 
view. I depart from him, only, in thinking that human rights start nine months before birth, not at that time, 
as does he.
56  VANCE, Laurence. Is Ron Paul Wrong on Abortion? Lew Rock Well, [s.l.], January 29 2008. Available at: 
<http://archive.lewrockwell.com/vance/vance133.html>.
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7.  WATKINS
The goal of Watkins57 is to clarify and defend Thomson58. His main contribution 
is the claim that the latter, for the most part, is filled not with analogies to abortion, 
but, rather, with counter-examples. To a degree, then, his essay is somewhat oblique 
or peripheral to the main concerns of the present paper, which is to view all libertarian 
discussions of abortion with regard to how they square with evictionism. Watkins’ essay 
does not confront this question explicitly, although he does touch upon it implicitly.
Another difficulty with Watkins from this perspective is that he is focused, as 
is Thomson, on morality, immorality, decency and other such concepts.59 If he would 
define any of them, he and I could at least have more of a chance of achieving real disa-
greement60. In the event, he does not,61 which makes this goal less attainable. But, we 
shall press on in any case.
Its main drawback from the viewpoint of the present paper is that it does not 
directly confront the evictionist hypothesis. The closest it comes to addressing this 
point of view is when it mentions “disconnect”62. But, it is only the forced kidney donor 
disconnecting himself from the violinist that is discussed, not the mother from the fe-
tus. Watkins, also, in this regard distinguishes between allowing to die and killing, but 
denigrates this distinction: 
But does anyone think that it would be morally better to surgically remove a nonvia-
ble fetus without killing it, knowing that it cannot survive outside the womb? So the 
57  WATKINS, Michael. Re-reading Thomson: Thomson’s unanswered challenge. Journal of Libertarian Studies, 
Auburn, vol. 20, n. 4, p. 41–59, sept./dec. 2006.
58  THOMSON, Judith Jarvis. A Defense of Abortion. Philosophy & Public Affairs, New Jersey, vol. 1, n. 1, p. 
69-80, sept./dec. 1971.
59  WATKINS, Michael. Re-reading Thomson: Thomson’s unanswered challenge. Journal of Libertarian Studies, 
Auburn, vol. 20, n. 4, p. 41–59, sept./dec. 2006.
60  This author uses the phrase “morally indecent” some half dozen times, without ever once indicating what he 
means by it; Watkins gives his readers no independent criterion of its definition.
61  Nor does Thomson. See on this Block, unpublished. Matters are even worse, in the sense that subjectivism of 
language rears its ugly head. What are we to make of the claim of Watkins’ “Most of us have the intuition that…” 
This may well be true, but it hardly constitutes justification for any belief. He continues: “… that it is permissible 
to kill someone, even an innocent someone, in self-defense, and not merely when our lives are at risk, but also 
where what is at risk is serious physical or psychological harm.” WATKINS, Michael. Re-reading Thomson: Thom-
son’s unanswered challenge. Journal of Libertarian Studies, Auburn, vol. 20, n. 4, p. 41–59, sept./dec. 2006. p. 
45. For a very different perspective on this issue, one not based on “intuition” but rather on logical implications 
of the NAP, see BLOCK, Walter E. Response to Jakobsson on human body shields. Libertarian Papers, 2010. 
Available at: <http://libertarianpapers.org/2010/25-block-response-to-jakobsson-on-human-body-shields/>.
62  WATKINS, Michael. Re-reading Thomson: Thomson’s unanswered challenge. Journal of Libertarian Studies, 
Auburn, vol. 20, n. 4, p. 41–59, sept./dec. 2006. p. 44-45.
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active-passive distinction, whatever moral weight it might have in some cases, would 
seem to be irrelevant for morally evaluating cases of abortion.63
Well, yes. This distinction does not amount to too much, given present medical 
technology, for the first two trimesters. But what about the third trimester? Here, this 
distinction is absolutely crucial; it spells the difference between abortion and eviction. 
But this author is too focused on “morality” to even consider this. Partial birth abortion 
in the seventh through ninth months is out and out murder, given that a “separation” or 
a “disconnect” between mother and (premature) baby is an alternative. This is an option 
completely ignored by this author.
Next, consider Watkins treatment of Thomson’s example where “you are stuck 
in a very small house with a rapidly growing child that will crush you if you don’t kill it.” 
Watkins continues: “Surely it is not murder to kill the child to save your life.”64 Not so fast. 
At least for the libertarian65 it all depends upon who is the owner of the house. If it is the 
child, then it most certainly is murder “to kill the child to save your life.” It is his house, 
after all. What in bloody blue blazes are you doing in his house, ready to murder him, 
when he has every right to expand as much as he wants. It is his house, after all. In actual 
point of fact, getting back to reality if just for one brief moment, who’s “house” is it that 
we are talking about when we discuss evictionism? Why, of course, the womb is the mo-
ther’s house. Therefore, she has a right to remove inhabitants of these premises of hers 
she does not, or no longer, welcomes. They then become trespassers.  The unwilling 
host of the violinist has a right to separate herself from him; to disconnect from him; to 
secede from him, dislodge him, if you will. But, being an innocent trespasser, he lacks 
mens rea, she has no right to slit his throat or shoot him. She is obligated, at least on 
the basis of libertarian law, to detach herself from him in the gentlest manner possible.
Watkins avers that Thomson’s “point is that it has not been shown that rights 
are in conflict whenever a woman contemplates whether to have an abortion, even 
if we assume that the fetus has a right to life.” Before responding substantively to this 
fallacy, first allow me to translate this into language acceptable to a libertarian: I subs-
titute “right not to be murdered” a negative right, for “right to life” which is a positive 
one.66 Since every right implies an obligation, the former, correct, version of this man-
dates that no one shall commit murder, while the latter incorrect one translates into 
63  WATKINS, Michael. Re-reading Thomson: Thomson’s unanswered challenge. Journal of Libertarian Studies, 
Auburn, vol. 20, n. 4, p. 41–59, sept./dec. 2006. p. 45.
64  WATKINS, Michael. Re-reading Thomson: Thomson’s unanswered challenge. Journal of Libertarian Studies, 
Auburn, vol. 20, n. 4, p. 41–59, sept./dec. 2006. p. 46.
65  This author also publishes in the Journal of Libertarian Studies. Does this give us the “right” to expect that 
libertarian considerations would play a role in his analysis?
66  WATKINS, Michael. Re-reading Thomson: Thomson’s unanswered challenge. Journal of Libertarian Studies, 
Auburn, vol. 20, n. 4, p. 41–59, sept./dec. 2006. p. 48.
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the requirement that we must keep such a person alive. We thus arrive at the following: 
Thomson’s “point is that it has not been shown that rights are in conflict whenever a 
woman contemplates whether to have an abortion, even if we assume that the fetus 
has a right … (not to be murdered).” As such, this is false. For there most certainly is a 
clash in rights when a woman decides to have an abortion. This act involves not one 
thing, but two: eviction, separation, secession, disconnection, on the one hand, and, on 
the other, outright murder. Why oh why cannot the woman, and Watkins and Thomson 
along with her, be satisfied with removing the fetus from her “house,” but not actively 
killing it? There is no more important distinction in this entire controversy, Watkins view 
that it is “irrelevant” to the contrary notwithstanding.67
Next, Watkins maintains “… no sound argument against abortion has yet to be 
provided even after we grant that a fetus is a person.”  He continues: “… how hard it is to 
find a general principle that is both obviously true and that applies to a wide range of 
abortion cases.” I cannot see my way clear to accepting either of these charges. Au con-
traire, it is easy to find a “general principle … against abortion” based on the assump-
tion, which I fully and enthusiastically accept, that the fetus is a rights-bearing person, 
like all other human beings. It is simple. The principle is the NAP, and private property 
rights. The mother owns the premises under contention. It is her womb, no one else’s. 
Therefore she and she alone has the right to determine who or what shall inhabit her 
property, her “house.”68 But she only has the right to evict, or depart from or separate 
from or secede from, any unwanted visitor; not to murder him. Evictionism solves this 
dispute. Abortion, which is eviction plus murder, most certainly does not. 
States Watkins: “No general argument against abortion will prove successful.”69 
Too bad, for him, he never so much has even considered evictionism. He repeats this 
sentiment: “… no general argument … will ever successfully show that abortion is im-
moral in a board range of cases.”70 I do not know about morality, since he has not vou-
chsafed us to define this concept, but abortion, in the third trimester, most certainly is 
an example of murder, and one third of fetuses, at any given time, are in the seventh, 
eighth or ninth months of their gestation, and is this is not a “broad range of cases” then 
nothing is.
67  WATKINS, Michael. Re-reading Thomson: Thomson’s unanswered challenge. Journal of Libertarian Studies, 
Auburn, vol. 20, n. 4, p. 41–59, sept./dec. 2006. p. 45.
68  WATKINS, Michael. Re-reading Thomson: Thomson’s unanswered challenge. Journal of Libertarian Studies, 
Auburn, vol. 20, n. 4, p. 41–59, sept./dec. 2006. p. 52.
69  WATKINS, Michael. Re-reading Thomson: Thomson’s unanswered challenge. Journal of Libertarian Studies, 
Auburn, vol. 20, n. 4, p. 41–59, sept./dec. 2006. p. 42.
70  WATKINS, Michael. Re-reading Thomson: Thomson’s unanswered challenge. Journal of Libertarian Studies, 
Auburn, vol. 20, n. 4, p. 41–59, sept./dec. 2006. p. 57.




It is one thing that the general populace does not embrace evictionism. Its in-
tellectuals71 do not start from the same premises as do libertarians: the NAP coupled 
with private property rights. Thus, we cannot in good conscience expect widespread 
agreement with this viewpoint. It is entirely a different matter within the libertarian 
community. Here, we all do accept these basic starting points. So, it is rather more disa-
ppointing that its spokesmen do not come to the same conclusion. The present paper 
is an attempt to rectify the analyses of several prominent libertarians who really should 
know better. Hopefully, it will convince not only them, but many others. The fate of 
many, many babies rests in the balance.
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